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i. inTroducTion
Since the end of the cold war, 69 
per cent of the countries with the lowest 
(HDI) in 2005 have experienced violent 
conflict and almost a quarter of them have 
suffered declines in their human develop-
ment in the period 1990–20051. Due to 
the impact on human development, coun-
tries experiencing conflict are less likely 
to attain the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs)2.The relationship between 
security (i.e., the absence of conflict) and 
development has encouraged aid donors 
and recipient countries to examine ways 
to address this issue.
Since the late 1990s, a rigorous dis-
cussion has taken place in the develop-
ment and security communities regarding 
the creation of a holistic approach to 
development. The discussion has centred 
on the idea of incorporating security issues 
in the poverty-reduction and development 
strategies of the donor countries. Since 
international assistance  
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mismanagement of the security system 
often has a negative impact on the security 
(and also the wealth) of a country and 
since corrupt or inefficient security-sector 
agencies weaken democratic institutions 
and processes, it was concluded that a new 
agenda of security sector reform (SSR) was 
required. This posed new challenges for 
the development community, while both 
donor and recipient countries have been 
sceptical of this new approach. Indeed, 
after more than a decade of discussions 
of the subject, only a small number of 
development agencies are openly engaged 
in the SSR agenda. This paper examines 
some of the arguments underlying this 
scepticism, using the cases of the United 
States’ assistance to Colombia and the 
United Kingdom’s assistance to Sierra Le-
one as illustrations. In doing so, the paper 
suggests some ways to limit the potential 
negative impact of supporting SSR. 
The security sector is broadly un-
derstood as the set of institutions that 
have the legitimate capacity to exercise 
coercive power. It includes security man-
agement and oversight bodies, justice and 
law-enforcement institutions and often 
non-statutory security forces3. One of the 
main tasks of SSR is to create efficient, ac-
countable and transparent security sector 
institutions that, like the other sectors of 
the state, follow the democratic norms of 
public administration. In this sense, SSR 
assistance has been framed in the broader 
concept of governance. The latter concept 
entails the rules, processes and behaviour 
through which power is exercised.
Even though SSR has been incorpo-
rated conceptually in the development 
discourse, in practice engagement with 
SSR assistance is not an uncomplicated 
matter. In fact, both donor and recipi-
ent countries have identified arguments 
against involvement in SSR. This paper 
examines a number of basic arguments 
against integrating support for SSR in the 
development agenda and investigates two in 
particular: (a) that SSR may divert resources 
from social sectors to the military; and (b) 
that coordination and coherence are prob-
lematic. Through the cases of US assistance 
to Colombia and British assistance to Sierra 
Leone this paper investigates the degree of 
relevance of these negative arguments and ex-
amines the possible limitations to the impact 
of these problems. Section II of this paper 
provides the theoretical framework for 
the discussion, presenting the theoretical 
background of the relationship between 
security and development and giving a 
conceptual description of SSR. Section 
III reviews the most common arguments 
against the integration of SSR support in 
the development agenda. In section IV the 
cases of Colombia and Sierra Leone are 
3 Hendrickson, D. and Karkoszka, A., ‘The challenges of security sector reform’, SIPRI Yearbook 2002:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), p. 179.
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used to assess the validity of the donors’ 
scepticism towards SSR. The conclusions 
of this paper are given in section V. 
The methodology used for this paper 
will be to analyse two cases of SSR assistance 
in developing countries. The objective of 
using case studies is to facilitate a deep 
discussion on each of the cases. Extended 
studies may permit general conclusions to 
be obtained, but they also limit the capa-
bility to investigate deeply particular cases. 
Two studies are done in order to permit a 
comparison and attain what extended stud-
ies provide: more general conclusions. The 
theoretical part is based on acknowledged 
literature about the subject. A compilation 
of different arguments for not engaging in 
SSR was also collected. The case studies are 
based mainly on public documents from 
the governments, and secondary sources 
of data are used.
ii. sEcuriTy in ThE dEvELoPMEnT 
aGEnda
The 1994 Human Development 
Report (HDR) introduced the concept 
of ‘human security’, a broader definition 
of security that was intended to capture 
those sources of insecurity in developing 
countries that had been played down by 
the cold war confrontation –such as hun-
ger, disease, repression and disruptions in 
daily life4. The 2005 HDR stated that both 
components of human security –poverty 
and the daily lives of individuals– are 
negatively affected by violent conflict. 
In that sense, security and development 
were seen as mutually dependent. As the 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated 
in the Millennium Declaration in 2000, 
‘humanity cannot enjoy security without 
development or development without 
security, and neither without the respect 
of human rights’, this being a particular 
concern in developing countries where 
most conflicts are taking place5.
The dynamics of conflict have 
changed since the end of the cold war, 
from interstate conflicts to more internal 
conflicts. Furthermore, today’s conflicts 
occur mainly in developing countries6.
This means that the burden of the costs of 
conflict is primarily borne by the poorest 
4 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions 
of Human Security (Oxford University Press: New York, 1994), p. 23. There are two different concepts 
of human security. A broader one as developed by UNDP and the Japanese Government, which includes 
development dimensions, and a narrower one, developed by the Canadian Government, which is limited 
to security from violence, but not only violence to the state but also to the individual (via small arms, land 
mines, etc.). Mack, A., ‘The concept of human security’, Promoting Security: But How and for Whom?, eds 
M. Brzoska and P. J. Croll (Bonn International Center for Conversion: Bonn, Oct. 2004), pp. 47–50.
5 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/2, 18 Sep. 2000. 
6 Dwan, R. and Holmqvist, C., ‘Major armed conflicts’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), p. 83–84.
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states in the world. The costs of conflict 
extend beyond the number of battle casu-
alties. Indeed, in many intra-state conflicts 
a great number of the dead are civilians. 
Beyond the loss of human life, the costs 
of conflict include inter alia disability, 
the collapse of basic infrastructure and 
psychological stress. The measurement of 
the broad costs of conflict poses several 
challenges7. The potentially most accu-
rate measurement of the long-term costs 
of conflict is the HDI. According to the 
tables on HDI from the 2005 HDR, there 
are 32 countries classed as having low hu-
man development, including 22 countries 
that have experienced violent conflict at 
some point since 1990. In addition, 5 of 
these 22 countries experienced declines in 
their HDI in the period 1990–20058. This 
relationship between conflict and under-
development inspired the debate regarding 
the promotion of peace and security as a 
way of supporting development.
One aspect of this debate concerns 
the question of what role the security 
sector plays in development. Frequently, 
many of the problems of countries in 
conflict stem from dysfunctional and 
undemocratic security sector institutions. 
In other cases, the problem is that a weak 
and incapable security sector is unable to 
provide security. In all these cases, while 
the security sector is part of the problem 
in conflict countries, at the same time it 
needs to be part of the solution9. Hence, a 
dysfunctional security sector is an obstacle 
for development and peace. Some of the 
donors’ attempts at dealing with the secu-
rity sector in developing countries aim at 
making it more functional and bound by 
democratic processes and principles. This 
section continues by defining the concept 
that has led this process of reforming the 
security sector10.
security sector 
governance reform
Most of the literature that defines SSR 
points out that it is a contested and chang-
ing concept. The lack of a clear definition 
is a problem since it has meant that the 
concept has been used very broadly—i.e., 
covering the rule of law, human rights and 
civil–military relations11. However, SSR 
is implicitly holistic and aims at coordi-
7 Sköns, E., ‘Financing security in a global context’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), pp. 294–295. 
8 UNDP (note i), p. 154. 
9 McCartney, C. et al. (eds), Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation, 
Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series no. 2 (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management: 
Berlin, 2004), p. 6, URL <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/ssr.htm>.
10 Other concepts entail disarmament, demobilization and reconstruction, for example.
11 For a list of principles that SSR should aim see Appendix 1.  
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nating the reform of all sectors that deal 
with security. This reform of the security 
sector is not a new issue, but it occurred 
previously through piecemeal reforms not 
as an all-inclusive process. Furthermore, 
SSR is not a matter that concerns only 
developing countries—many developed 
countries have undertaken this process. 
However, this paper focuses on the sup-
port of SSR from donor countries to 
developing countries.
The holism that characterizes SSR 
derives initially from the development con-
cept of governance. This concept covers the 
rules, processes and behaviour by which 
power is exercised. One way to facilitate 
the understanding of the concept of SSR 
is to start from a context that presupposes 
a need to transform this sector. Such a 
context entails a dysfunctional security 
sector that fails to provide security to its 
citizens (by being unable to provide the 
service or by being the cause of insecurity) 
or a dysfunctional security sector that lacks 
democratic control. Thus, SSR is meant to 
tackle these failings and enhance the supply 
of security. It is important to bear in mind 
that SSR varies according to its aims. Sev-
eral authors, including Ball, Hendrickson 
and Karkoszka and Bryden and Hänggi, 
suggest that the form and aims of SSR will 
be influenced by the specific characteristics 
of each country—the level of economic 
development, the type of political system 
and the particular security situation12.
The central aspects of SSR are: the 
establishment of professional security sec-
tor forces of a suitable size and with the 
corresponding appropriate resources; the 
creation of explicit mandates for the differ-
ent forces (e.g., police and armed forces); 
and the formation of democratic controls 
to regulate the sector13. SSR can be seen 
as having four dimensions: (a) political, 
which mainly concerns civilian oversight; 
(b) social, which aims to guarantee the 
security of citizens; (c) economic, which 
focuses on the allocation of resources to 
the SSR actors; and (d) institutional, which 
deals mainly with the professionalization of 
the security actors. The last dimension is 
most likely to be ignored by development 
cooperation interests, since it falls under 
the framework of military assistance14. 
However, for reform in the institutional 
dimension to be coherent, it should be 
done in coordination with reform in the 
other three dimensions of SSR.
The definition of security sector re-
form used in this paper is: 
12 Bryden, A. and Hänggi, H., ‘Reforming and reconstructing the security sector’, DCAF, Security Govern-
ance in Post-conflict Peace Building (Lit Verlag: Munster, 2005), pp. 28–30. 
13 Wulf, H., Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An Analysis of the International Debate and 
Potentials for Implementing Reforms with Recommendations for Technical Cooperation (GTZ: Eschborn, 
Oct. 2000), p. 18. 
14 Wulf (note xiii), p. 19.
P r o B L E M a s  d E  s E G u r i d a d
82 
The reforms of state institutions whose man-
date is to provide security, with the aim of increasing 
democratic control and efficiency. As well as the 
armed forces, the police, the intelligence service, 
etc., the institutions include civil authorities and 
actors that control and have an oversight to the 
security sector (i.e., the parliament, civil society and 
similar actors), and the justice, law enforcement and 
non-statutory security forces 15.
This paper assumes that SSR includes 
governance reforms—references to SSR 
should be taken as including governance 
reform. In theory, SSR is part of the 
concept of governance, but in practice, 
challenges to incorporating security in 
the development agenda remain. Both 
donors and recipients are unconvinced 
of the need for direct engagement in SSR. 
The following sections investigate some of 
the arguments of those countries that are 
sceptical about providing SSR assistance 
and assess their relevance.
iii. ThE arGuMEnTs aGainsT 
EnGaGinG in ssr assisTancE
Most of the donors are engaged in 
various security-related programmes such 
as demobilization, de-mining and control 
of small arms. However, these activities do 
not engage these countries in supporting 
comprehensive programmes of SSR; they 
are piecemeal packages that have been 
done in the past without a comprehensive 
view being taken 16. This section examines 
why there are so few donor countries 
engaged directly with SSR and describes 
the main explanations for scepticism 
towards SSR. It should be borne in mind 
that, while these sceptical arguments are 
a matter of concern for both donors and 
recipients, the recipient countries feel their 
ultimate effect. To aid the focus in the 
comparative case studies, in this section 
these arguments are divided into those 
of the donors and those of the recipients 
(see table 1). 
The question of how the security 
sector might contribute to development 
is not a new issue. In fact, particularly 
in the mid-20th century the impression 
was that the military was a modernizing 
catalyst, either by being able to effect 
controversial reforms or by empowering 
nationalist sentiments to unify countries. 
Moreover, some economist, support the 
idea that military industries create spill-
over technologies for civilian industries, 
enhancing the aggregated national pro-
duction. However, the prediction that the 
military would act as a modernizer did not 
come true. Indeed, once the military were 
in power the perception was that they were 
human rights abusers, corrupt, repressive 
and undemocratic (particularly after the 
15 Adapted from Hendrickson and Karkoszka (note iii), p. 179.
16 Wulf (note xiii), p. 12. 
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several bloody coups d’état in Africa and 
Latin America). Furthermore, as Brauer 
demonstrates, the spill-over from military 
industries proved to be less beneficial to 
national industrial production than the re-
verse spill-over from civilian industry 17. 
The donors’ arguments
The confrontation between East and 
West during the cold war was also reflected 
in the patterns and style of aid delivery. 
Strategic objectives often influenced the 
two blocs’ delivery of international aid, 
with the aim of encouraging a specific 
country to join (or remain in) one of 
the political and economic systems. For 
instance, countries such as the USA and 
France, which incorporated security as-
sistance in their development packages, 
often gave more in military assistance 
than in development cooperation18. Such 
aid was mainly in the form of weapons or 
military training. 
With the end of the cold war, there 
was hope that, together with the reduc-
tion of the levels of military spending, 
the patterns and style of aid delivery 
would change. The first of these expecta-
tions, the reduction of military spending, 
implied that resources would be released 
from the military for other sectors of the 
economy—the so-called peace dividend. 
High military expenditure was seen as un-
productive since public spending priori-
ties were diverted from key development 
areas such as health and education. This, 
together with the structural adjustment 
programmes from the international fi-
nancial institutions (IFIs), put pressure 
on developing countries to reduce their 
military budgets 19. The second of these 
expectations, a change in the patterns and 
style of aid delivery, meant that develop-
ment agencies disengaged from the work 
with security-related programmes, as it 
resembled working with those responsible 
for the coups d’état of the past. The devel-
opment institutions wanted to avoid the 
use of international cooperation as a cold 
war-type strategic tool20.
From these perspectives arise two of 
the important arguments for scepticism 
towards incorporating SSR in the develop-
ment agenda. First, one of the central ideas 
of the peace dividend is that there are to be 
17 Brauer, J., ‘The arms industry in developing nations: history and post-cold war assessment’, Paper pre-
sented at the conference Military Expenditures in Developing and Emerging Nations, Middlesex University, 
London, 13–14 Mar. 1998, pp. 6–10.
18 Wulf (note xiii), p. 13. 
19 On structural adjustments and the peace dividend from the IMF see Hamind, D. et al., ‘Military spend-
ing, the peace dividend, and fiscal adjustment’, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 48, no. 2, (IMF: Washington, DC, 
2001), URL <http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2001/02/pdf/davoodi.pdf>
20 Wulf (note xiii), p. 13. 
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extra resources to spend on social priorities. 
Some donors fear that including the SSR 
agenda in development assistance would 
have the opposite effect: that resources for 
social sector assistance would be diverted to 
security-related issues, possibly reducing 
the overall support for social matters. This 
could be particularly the case for the devel-
opment assistance budget, since it is usually 
limited and different programmes compete 
for resources. It is important to bear in 
mind that financing security is an expen-
sive endeavour, which usually requires a 
long-term engagement from both donors 
and the recipient countries. Furthermore, 
SSR often increases the levels of security 
expenditure in the recipient countries, at 
least in the short term, caused by, for ex-
ample, modernization programmes and 
training. While funding for these may be 
provided initially by the donor country, the 
recipient has to sustain them, thus divert-
ing resources from the social sector to the 
security sector at the national level.
The second argument studied here 
arose particularly after the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001 on the USA: that 
development assistance will return to cold 
war-style strategic support, with the role of 
the recipient countries in the ‘global war 
on terrorism’ will dictate the direction of 
the aid policy.
However, the scepticism also arises 
from the complexity of integrating the 
SSR programmes themselves, which en-
dorses the third fear: that coordination 
and coherence are too problematic. The 
ideal incorporation of SSR in develop-
ment policy would require coordination 
and coherence from the donor’s defence 
ministry, development agency and often 
trade ministry. For instance, there is often 
conflict between the interests of the devel-
opment agencies’ policies, which pressure 
recipient countries not to buy unneces-
sary weapons, and those of the donor’s 
trade ministry, which push for arms sales 
to the same recipient countries. Another 
difficulty might arise when the various 
government departments involved have 
to differentiate between what is military 
assistance and what is SSR. While some 
argue that the supply of arms should be 
part of SSR, as it promotes the efficiency 
of the security sector, others argue that it 
is military assistance, as it might endorse 
interests in conflict with the develop-
ment agenda. A consequence of the latter 
argument is that OECD countries cannot 
include assistance to the military in their 
development cooperation budgets. Some 
argue that denying involvement with the 
military means ignoring a major source of 
development problems and of possible so-
lutions and so prevents the donor countries 
from engaging in holistic programmes of 
SSR21.  In fact, the exclusion of the support 
for the military sector from development 
21 On the supply of arms to aid-recipient countries in the context of SSR see Wulf, H., ‘Chances, dilemmas 
and obstacles of the security sector reform’, McCartney, C. et al. (eds), Security Sector Reform: Potentials 
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agencies’ programmes means that strong 
coordination is required with the donors’ 
defence and foreign affairs ministries in 
order to prevent piecemeal reforms that 
do not entail comprehensive SSR.
The problems of coordination and 
coherence are also often present in the 
donor community. In particular, some 
donors have specific programmes for 
supporting SSR and have undertaken the 
institutional reforms required for provid-
ing coordinated policies, whereas other 
donor states are struggling to understand 
and integrate the SSR concept. This has 
affected the overall coherence and coordi-
nation between donors due to differences 
in terminology and approaches. The main 
examples of this particular situation are 
the differences between the approaches of 
the UK, the USA, Germany and France. 
The UK has integrated different govern-
ment institutions (with the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), the Department for 
International Development (DFID) and 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO)) to form a coordinated and holistic 
policy for SSR. In contrast, the USA has 
not even internalized the concept of SSR 
and there are several agencies conducting 
SSR programmes in a disorganized man-
ner. Germany has a coherent approach but 
has been reluctant to engage more directly 
with the military, supporting mainly jus-
tice and internal security and the reform 
of the police. Finally, France has not so 
far engaged directly in SSR. Some donors 
may find the process of coordination and 
coherence too complicated and hence may 
prefer to stick with classical development 
assistance programmes 22.
The fourth sceptical argument—that 
countries in need of SSR are fragile states that 
are difficult to work with—arises since the 
countries that are usually in need of SSR 
support are conflict-torn or post-conflict 
states. According to Collier and Hoeffler, 
the returns from providing aid in post-
conflict situations are greater in terms of 
increasing the levels of growth than in 
other situations, particularly in the first 
four years after conflicts are resumed23.
Nevertheless, engagement of the donor 
community with fragile states remains low. 
This probably explains why involvement 
in SSR programmes is also quite short. 
Engaging in SSR implies working with 
these complicated partners, the fragile 
states, which have often been avoided by 
and Challenges for Conflict Transformation, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series no. 2 (Berghof Research 
Center for Constructive Conflict Management: Berlin, 2004), pp. 71–74.
22 Wulf, H., ‘Security sector reform in developing and transitional countries’, McCartney, C. et al. (eds), 
Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation, Berghof Handbook Dialogue 
Series no. 2 (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management: Berlin, 2004), pp. 9–28.
23 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., ‘Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies’, Development Research 
Group, World Bank, Washington, DC, Oct. 2002, p. 8.  
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the donor community since they are too 
complicated to work with or lack strategic 
importance. The difficulties of working 
with fragile states in SSR issues are numer-
ous. For instance, the SSR recipients are 
often post-conflict countries, since there 
is usually more willingness to engage in 
all level of reforms following conflict. 
However, even though there is willing-
ness, these countries’ institutional capacity 
to support development programmes is 
weak. Often a recipient country’s lack of 
enthusiasm for engaging with reforms is 
confused with a lack of commitment to 
democracy or even peace. Instead, such 
unwillingness is due to lack of instru-
ments, resources and assistance to pursue 
the difficult changes that constitute a re-
form24. So, in spite of the higher potential 
of aid in post-conflict countries, the donor 
community has a pessimistic view of such 
situations. In addition, donors are reluc-
tant to engage in long-term development 
plans in conflict-prone countries due to 
their instability25.
SSR can also be implemented in con-
flict-torn societies with whom reluctance 
to work is probably even greater. In this 
situation the military might be unwill-
ing to make any type of change given 
its unstable security environment. The 
reluctance might have strategic explana-
tions or even be caused by suspicious of 
external support. But it can also be an 
excuse to maintain the power invested 
to the military. This lack of a favourable 
partner might give disincentives to donors 
in engaging with conflict-torn states.
24 Hendrickson, D. and Karkoszka, A., ‘Security sector reform and donor policies’, eds A. Schnabel and 
H. G. Ehrhart, Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (United Nations University Press: 
New York, 2005), p. 34. 
25 Addison, T. and McGillivray M., ‘Aid to conflict-affected countries: lessons for donors’, Conflict, Security 
and Development, vol. 4, no. 3 (2004). 
Table 1. 
arGuMEnTs aGainsT EnGaGinG in ssr assisTancE
From the donor countries’ perspective
Resources diverted to the military
Return to cold war-style strategic support
Problems of coordination and coherence
Working with complicated partners
From the recipient countries’ perspective
Security is a sensitive area for national 
sovereignty
Difficult balance between efficiency and 
democracy
Focus on supporting the forces authorized to 
use force
Lack of local ownership 
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The recipients’ arguments
As stated above, the reluctance to en-
gage in SSR programmes also comes from 
the recipient countries. There are four 
sources of this reluctance. First, security is 
a sensitive area that involves dealing with 
one of the sectors most relevant to the 
sovereignty of a country. Often the secu-
rity institutions—usually the military and 
the police—have deep-seated nationalist 
feelings and so it is difficult for them to 
accept external interference in their af-
fairs. The citizens share this sensitivity, 
since the security of a country has been 
historically recognized as a matter of na-
tional integrity.
Second, there is a difficult balance 
between efficiency and democracy when 
implementing SSR programmes26. In this 
context efficiency means the rapid and 
effective solution of the security problems 
of a country, while democracy is the pres-
ervation of principles and values such as 
accountability, the rule of law, separation 
of powers, participatory processes, etc. 
The desire of some donor countries for 
quick solutions has sometimes meant that 
the importance of stable institutions and 
processes that will make the reform lon-
ger- lasting has been overlooked. This type 
of aid is uninteresting for the developing 
country as the assistance do not provides 
lasting results and do permit interference 
in a sensitive area as security. This disre-
gard of the importance of democratic pro-
cesses in attaining security has led, in some 
cases, to the third fear: a focus on supporting 
the reform of the institutions authorized to 
use force (among them the armed forces, 
the police and paramilitary forces), leav-
ing aside key actors in the governance of 
the security sector. Given that these forces 
often represent the powerful institutions 
of a state, there is a reinforcement of the 
security interest of the elites. This has 
led to the ignoring of the involvement of 
grassroots actors in the definition of the 
security concerns, affecting the overall 
ownership of the SSR programmes27. 
Furthermore, the recipient countries 
often perceive their security problems as 
too complex for donors to understand. 
Hence, they fear that the SSR programmes 
suggested by the donors are not suitable 
for their specific situation. This scepticism 
is not ill founded. Countries’ experience 
from the IFIs’ structural adjustment 
26 Presentation from Edmunds, T., ‘Security sector reforms in transforming societies’, Seminarium om 
SSR [Seminar on SSR], Organized by the Folke Bernadotteakademins Forskarforum, Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 25 Apr. 2006. 
27 See Farr, V. A., ‘Voices from the margins: a response to security sector reform in developing and transitional 
countries’, McCartney, C. et al. (eds), Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict 
Transformation, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series no. 2 (Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management: Berlin, 2004), pp. 63–70.
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programmes, particularly in the 1980s 
and 1990s, left a suspicion of the under-
standing of particular country situations. 
The ‘one-size-fits-all’ methodology in the 
economic policies promulgated by the 
IFIs left devastating effects in many de-
veloping countries. The SSR programmes 
promoted by the developed countries are 
not far from this phenomenon. Indeed, 
current programmes assisting SSR have 
been mainly about the diffusion of the 
Western norms and practices of the se-
curity sector to the recipient countries28. 
This gives rise to the recipient countries’ 
fourth fear: that SSR lacks local ownership 
in many cases. 
While the arguments against engag-
ing in SSR are shared by both donor and 
recipient countries, they have been pre-
sented separately here in order to simplify 
the focus of this paper. The list of reasons 
to be sceptical about engagement in SSR in 
the development agenda could be longer 
than that given here. Even though there 
might be many reasons not to engage in 
SSR, the reality is that security problems 
still pose great challenges for some coun-
tries in achieving better living standards. 
This reality has to be confronted somehow 
by both the donors and the developing 
countries. The following section of this 
paper examines if this scepticism about 
engagement in SSR is relevant or not.
iv. EnGaGinG in ssr assisTancE: 
ThE casEs of coLoMBia and 
siErra LEonE
This section studies two countries 
that have been implementing SSR policies 
supported by donor countries: Colombia 
and Sierra Leone. These countries differ 
in many respects—geographical location, 
history, political and economical develop-
ment, just to mention a few—prompting 
some to argue that these are not comparable 
cases. However, there are some similarities 
and differences, particularly regarding the 
two SSR processes, that make the com-
parison interesting, as is described below. 
This section first justifies the selection of 
the country studies of Colombia and Sierra 
Leone, then presents brief background 
information on both countries, and finally 
looks at whether the donors’ arguments for 
not engaging in SSR are relevant. Two spe-
cific arguments will be examined for both 
countries: (a) the diversion of resources 
to the military; and (b) the problems of 
coordination and coherence.
The choice of us assistance to 
colombia and British assistance 
to sierra Leone
The selection of the case studies was 
not straightforward for this study. Given 
28 Hendrickson and Karkoszka (note xxiv), p. 32.
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that the subject of SSR is a relatively new 
issue, the quantity and quality of evalua-
tions on the topic are limited, and hence 
there are restrictions on the availability of 
information. However, the novelty of the 
SSR agenda is not the only explanation 
for this scarcity: indeed, in contradiction 
to one of the SSR objectives—to promote 
openness and transparency in the secu-
rity sector—information on SSR is often 
available from neither the donors nor the 
recipient countries due to the sensitivity 
of the matter: the security sector29.
 Even though case studies can be 
too specific and present many limitations 
to provide generalized conclusions, they 
can elucidate particularities that extended 
studies overlook. There are two main 
similarities and two main differences that 
motivate the comparison between the 
cases of US assistance to Colombia and 
British assistance to Sierra Leone. First, the 
USA and UK are among the countries with 
the highest aid delivery in absolute terms. 
This makes them relevant cases to investi-
gate from the donor perspective. Second, 
Colombia and Sierra Leone, respectively, 
are large security assistance recipients from 
these two donor countries. Third, the USA 
and UK have different approaches to SSR, 
making interesting their comparison for 
the investigation. Finally, Colombia and 
Sierra Leone are in different conflict stages. 
The first is in a conflict phase, while the 
latter is a post-conflict country. In sum, 
the objective is that this set of similarities 
and differences complement each other to 
provide an illustrative comparison and to 
elucidate appealing conclusions. 
The case of Colombia is studied over 
the period 1999–2005 and the case of Si-
erra Leone over 2002–2005. The chosen 
periods reflect the years in which the re-
spective donor countries engaged directly 
in SSR assistance in these countries. From 
the list of arguments against engaging in 
SSR given in section III, only two of the 
donors’ arguments will are examined for 
both cases: (a) the diversion of resources 
to the military; and (b) the problems of 
coordination and coherence. These argu-
ments were chosen since they focus on the 
funding perspective of the donor support, 
which reflect the donor’s strategy to assist 
the recipient country. This permits the 
examination of whether the assistance 
style illustrates the arguments against 
engaging in SSR.
 
colombia: a background
Unlike the rest of Latin America, 
Colombia has been a relatively stable 
democracy. Of all the countries in the 
region, Colombia has the longest unin-
terrupted democratic regime. However, 
the fact that a country has held elections 
does not imply that it acts entirely demo-
29 Please see section II of this paper. 
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cratically or pluralistically. Indeed, with 
the virtual disappearance of the Sendero 
Luminoso guerrillas in Peru, Colombia is 
the only country in South America with 
an active armed conflict30. Like all armed 
conflicts, that in Colombia is complex. Es-
sentially, there are two main rebel groups 
that defy state control. Both are leftist 
and continue to promote their Marxist 
ideology, although some experts point out 
that economic interests from the revenues 
from kidnapping and drug-trafficking 
have replaced these beliefs31. Right-wing 
paramilitary groups and the widespread 
drug-trafficking in the country have also 
propelled the conflict. The paramilitary 
groups are involved in drug-trafficking 
and have connections with the legal armed 
forces in Colombia. The root causes of 
the Colombian conflict are: a mixture of 
a weak state with little state presence in 
much of the country and, hence, weak rule 
of law; economic and social inequalities, 
particularly unjust distribution of land; 
and a mostly oligarchic political system. 
The two latter factors do not inevitably 
lead to conflict, but combined with a 
weak state provide avenue for the expres-
sion of discontent through illegal means. 
The security sector in Colombia should 
be understood within the context of this 
internal ongoing conflict.
SSR in Colombia does not concern 
a transition from a military regime to a 
democratic system, as it does elsewhere in 
Latin America. Nevertheless, as in other 
countries in the region, the Colombian 
military uses methods that just maintain 
a democratic façade32. Thus, even though 
Colombia has a democratic regime, many 
of the actual procedures it employs in the 
security sector do not correspond to the 
governance principles. Indeed, in many 
cases the channels needed for governance 
of the security sector exist, but civilian 
interest in the armed forces and the way 
they combat the country’s security prob-
lems is quite low33. On the contrary, there 
is large popular support for strengthening 
the security sector to end the internal con-
flict, as was seen in the 2002 presidential 
elections. However, as Thomas Bruneau 
has demonstrated, actual civilian interest 
in making the security sector account-
30 While the number of battle- related deaths in Colombia in 2004 was more than 700, in Peru it was only 
25. See Harbom, L. and Wallensteen, P., ‘Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990– 2004’, SIPRI Yearbook 
2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), pp. 
129–132.
31 Dwan and Holmqvist (note vi), p. 92.
32 Diamint, R., ‘Security challenges in Latin America’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 23, no. 1 
(2004) p. 49.
33 Hamburger Informationen zur Friedenforschung und Sicherheitspolitick, ‘Towards more effective 
assistance in security sector reform’, Policy Brief, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, 
Hamburg, June 2002, p. 4. 
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able is very low34. For instance, when the 
defence budget is discussed in Congress, 
it is approved the day after it is presented. 
The reason for such a paradox could be 
the fear of the armed forces that part of 
the Colombian population feels.
Several civilian massacres at the hands 
of paramilitary forces with the support or 
negligence of the military have made part 
of the civil society distrustful of the armed 
forces35. Furthermore, the democratic pro-
cedures in Colombia are seen by the armed 
forces as an impediment to fulfilling their 
mandate, along with the obstacles caused 
by the extended functions of the armed 
forces36. The air-mobile battalion for the 
interdiction of drugs is an example of 
traditionally civilian functions that are car-
ried out by the military37. Hence, the un-
stable civil–military relations can explain 
this paradoxical approach to security.
In addition to the problems of civ-
il–military relations, the security sector in 
Colombia is hampered by weak rule of law. 
Not only is the system inefficient, corrup-
tion is also widespread. For instance, even 
though the justice sector is independent it 
is still overloaded, corrupt and intimidated 
by both rebel groups and criminal gangs, 
and hence is ineffective38.The country is 
also confronting new security sector chal-
lenges from the peace negotiations with the 
paramilitaries during the administration 
of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez. Disarma-
ment, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) programmes, typical in post-con-
flict situations, have been going on with 
the right-wing paramilitary groups. There 
are fears that some demobilized para-
militaries have rejoined non-demobilized 
paramilitary groups. Others fears concern 
the possible retaliation from the left-wing 
rebel groups in those areas in which the 
paramilitaries were demobilized, facilitated 
by little protection from the state.
The USA is the main donor of sup-
port to Colombia’s SSR programme. 
During the period 1999–2005 total US 
expenditure on assistance to Colombia 
was approximately US$3 billion39. Co-
34 Bruneau, T., ‘The military in post-conflict societies: lessons from Central America and prospects for 
Colombia’, Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peace Building (United Nations University Press: 
New York, 2005), p. 234.
35 Example of massacres are the ones of Mapiripán (July 1997), Barrancabermeja (May 1998), La Gabarra-
Tibú (Aug. 1999) and San José de Apartadó (2005). Watson, C., ‘Civil–military relations in Colombia: a 
workable relationship or a case of fundamental reform?’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3 (2000), p. 
538. 
36 Watson (note xxxv), pp. 538–39.
37 Watson (note xxxv), pp. 542.
38 US Department of State, ‘2002–2003 report on supporting human rights and democracy: the U.S. 
record’, Washington, DC, 24 June 2003, URL <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2002/21761.htm>. 
39 Sköns, E. et al., ‘Military expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
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lombia is the major recipient of US aid 
in the western hemisphere and the fifth 
in the world after Iraq, Israel, Egypt and 
Afghanistan40. The principal reasons are 
that Colombia produces around 90 per 
cent of the cocaine and 40 per cent of the 
heroin entering the USA41 and has three 
illegal armed forces listed by the US State 
Department as terrorist groups (the two 
main left-wing guerrillas and a right-wing 
paramilitary group). Hence, the USA has 
identified two major threats in Colombia: 
drugs-trafficking and terrorism.
   The USA’s strong involvement in 
Colombia began after the Colombian 
Government called for international sup-
port in its 1999 Plan Colombia initia-
tive. This aimed at restoring the peace 
negotiations with the rebel groups and 
reinforcing the war on drugs while pro-
viding alternative economic activities to 
drug production. Other components of 
the plan are to reform the security sector 
by modernizing the armed forces and 
police, making an efficient justice system 
and supporting the protection and respect 
of human rights42. 
The first main focus of the US as-
sistance to Colombia is to decrease the 
levels of illegal drugs coming into the USA 
through the interdiction of illicit flights, 
aerial eradication of drug crops and alter-
native development. The US support to 
Plan Colombia can be understood within 
the SSR framework. As explained above, 
the plan’s aims include modernization of 
the security sector, including the armed 
forces and the justice system. Within 
these programmes, the USA intends to 
support the regaining of state control 
over isolated areas of Colombia, provid-
ing the proper equipment and training 
to both the military and the police and 
assisting in the professionalization of 
the armed forces. The USA also supports 
democratic and rule-of-law projects in the 
security sector; assists the justice system 
to be more efficient through the creation 
of more capable and organized justice 
mechanisms; gives aid for the training of 
auditing officers for promoting transpar-
ency and less corruption; and supports 
human rights protection43. It should be 
borne in mind that training and support 
Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), table 8.7, ‘US assistance to Colombia by programme, 
financial year 1998–2005’, p. 332.
40 US Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘Drug control: U.S. non-military assistance to Colombia 
Is beginning to show intended results, but programs are not readily sustainable’, GAO Report-04-726, 
Washington, DC, July 2004, p. 7.  
41 GAO (note xl), p. 4.
42 US Department of State, ‘Plan Colombia’, Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, 14 Mar. 2001, URL <http://
www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001>.
43 GAO (note xl), pp. 18–21. 
93
o a s i s ,  n ° 1 2
T E M a s  G L o B a L E s
in combating drugs-trafficking is part of a 
holistic view of SSR, since the illicit drugs 
trade in Colombia is a major threat to the 
country’s stability. 
The arguments against engaging 
in ssr assistance: 
the case of colombia
This section examines whether the 
arguments from the donor community 
perspective for not engaging in SSR sup-
port are illustrated in the case of the US 
assistance to Colombia, particularly the 
arguments regarding: (a) the diversion of 
resources to the military; and (b) the prob-
lems of coordination and coherence. 
The diversion of resources 
to the military
When examining SSR assistance, 
the fear of transfer of resources from the 
social sector to the security sector can oc-
cur in both the national and international 
spheres. The international assistance can 
influence some national public policies 
since programmes that are initially fi-
nanced by the donors must be followed 
and sustained by national governments.
Examining the trends in the security 
spending of a country is a complicated 
matter. The most widely recognized 
data measuring the investment of public 
expenditure priorities on security only 
include the military sector, excluding the 
police and the justice sector for instance. 
However, if the police forces have para-
military functions, they are included in 
the definition of military spending, which 
is the case for Colombia44. This section 
considers the military expenditure (in-
cluding the police) of Colombia for the 
period 1995–2004.
During this 10-year period, Colom-
bia increased its military expenditure as a 
share of GDP from 2.6 per cent in 1995 
to 3.8 per cent in 2004 (see table 2). This 
means that the burden on the Colombian 
economy represented by military expen-
diture increased by 46 per cent over this 
period. There are two main peaks in the 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Military expenditure  2.6 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.8
Table 2. 
MiLiTary EXPEndiTurE in coLoMBia as a sharE of ThE Gross 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, SIPRI, Stockholm, 
2006, URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html>.
44 Stålenheim, P., ‘Sources and methods for SIPRI military expenditure data’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), pp. 374–76.
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increase of military expenditure in Colom-
bia, one in 1999 and the other in 2001. 
The military burden has been maintained 
since 2001 at or near its highest point of 
3.8 per cent of GDP. Two key questions 
are examined below. First, whether there 
is a correlation between the increase in 
military expenditure and the decrease in 
social spending; and second, whether the 
US support of the SSR in Colombia has a 
causal relation with this.
Regarding the first question, for sim-
plicity social expenditure will be limited 
to spending on education and health45. In 
order to illustrate whether there has been 
some diversion of social expenditure to the 
military, expenditure on education, health 
and the military in Colombia for the peri-
od 1998–2001 can be considered46. Estab-
lishing this correlation can be problematic 
because there are many other factors that 
could determine changes in public budget 
management, or variations in the military 
expenditure could be reflected in other 
areas of the public spending—not neces-
sarily in education and health. However, 
this paper assumes that since Colombia is 
a resource-limited country, and some of 
the major areas of public expenditure are 
usually education, health and the military, 
any variation in the spending of one of 
the sectors will modify the investment in 
the others. According to Colombia’s 1991 
Constitution, both education and health 
are public spending priorities47. However, 
despite this prioritization, the overall 
levels of social expenditure, particularly 
education, has been decreasing as can be 
seen in table 3. 
For the first three years, 1998–2000, 
the levels of spending on both education 
and health were higher than the military 
budget. Nonetheless, the share of educa-
tion spending has decreased during these 
four years (by 22.2 per cent), with a par-
ticular drop between 2000 and 2001 of 
21 per cent. Simultaneously, military ex-
penditure increased over the four years, by 
22.6 per cent, roughly the same percentage 
change as the decrease in education expen-
diture. The public spending on health has 
remained relatively stable. Thus, there has 
been a change in the public expenditure 
priorities in Colombia over this period, 
particularly regarding education and 
military spending.
45 Broadly speaking, social expenditure covers public and private allocations in a broad range of other 
areas. Since the aim is to compare public expenditure priorities, the private spending in this sector will be 
excluded. 
46 This period was chosen because of the availability of comparable data, while it also coincides with the 
major changes in military expenditure level in Colombia. For the methodology for the data selected see 
Perdomo, C., ‘Methodology for international comparison of government priorities’, Background Paper, 
SIPRI, Stockholm, 2004, URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/bgpapers/frontpage.html>. 
47 Constitución Política de la República de Colombia [Political constitution of the Republic of Colombia], 
1991, Chapter IV, Article 361. 
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Establishing the causal relation con-
necting this change in public spending 
priorities in Colombia with the USA’s SSR 
assistance to Colombia has to be done 
with caution. The initiative to implement 
a plan to promote peace, economic devel-
opment and the enhancement of security 
was made by Colombian President Andres 
Pastrana in 1999, which coincides with 
the first boost in military spending. Under 
Pastrana’s government the number of sol-
diers increased from 79 000 to 140 000, 
mostly accounted for by a tripling of the 
number of professional soldiers48. It was 
the Colombian Government that asked 
for international support for Plan Colom-
bia, with the USA being the country that 
contributed the most. However, as a re-
port from the US Congressional Research 
Service has established, the objectives of 
Colombia and the USA for Plan Colom-
bia differ, although they overlap in some 
respects (e.g., the drugs fight)49. While for 
Colombia the objectives of the plan are 
to promote peace and economic growth, 
for the USA are to stop the trafficking 
of cocaine and heroine from Colombia. 
Over time, the emphasis of Plan Colombia 
shifted to increase the focus on the USA’s 
objective. This was clear with the national 
shift towards prioritizing the military 
under President Uribe’s administration, 
which for example established by decree 
in 2002 a war tax that totalled 2.6 billion 
pesos to be distributed in 2002–200450.  
Thus, although this was clearly a national 
decision, the effect of the US support to 
Colombia has important consequences 
for the recipient’s national policies. For 
instance, if the USA provides 16 UH-60L/
Table 3. 
EducaTion, hEaLTh and MiLiTary EXPEndiTurE in coLoMBia as a PErcEnTaGE of Gross doMEsTic 
ProducT, 1998–2001
 Education Health Military
1998 4.5 3.5 3.1
1999 4.3 4.0 3.5
2000 4.4 3.7 3.4
2001 3.5 3.6 3.8
Source: Perdomo, C., ‘Tables of military and social expenditure’, Background Paper, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2004, 
URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/bgpapers/frontpage.html>. 
48 ‘Profile: Andres Pastrana’, BBC News, 15 Jan. 2002, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1759419.stm>.
49 Veillette, C., ‘Plan Colombia: a progress report’, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for 
Congress, Washington, DC, 9 May 2005, p. 2. 
50 Stålenheim, P. et al., ‘Tables of military expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), p. 369. 
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S-70A Black Hawk helicopters to Colom-
bia, 14 for the army and 2 for the police, 
as was the case in 200151, the Colombian 
Government would have to maintain the 
machines and train its soldiers to make 
use of the helicopters. The USA provided 
integrated logistics services, technical as-
sistance and field services in this specific 
case, but at some point these activities will 
have to be supported by the government of 
Colombia. Hence, even though the strong 
focus on the military has been a national 
Type of assistance  2000a 2001  2002  2003b 2004  Total 
Agencyc      
Department of Stated 774.9 48.0 275.4 416.6 495.8 2 110.7
USAIDe  123.5 0 104.5 122.2 122.2 472.4
Department of Defense  128.5 190.2 119.1 165.0 122.0 724.8
Total  1 026.9 238.2 499.0 703.8 740.0 3 307.9
Of which non-militaryf      
 Obligated  125 24 151 152 123 575
 Expended  1 130 97 59 23 310
Table 4. 
us assisTancE To coLoMBia By sourcE, financiaL yEars 2000–2004
Figures are in US$ m. Years are financial years.
a Figures for 2000 include funds appropriated for Plan Colombia through the 2000 Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations Act.
b Figures for 2003 include $93 million in foreign military financing funds appropriated in the 2003 Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act; $34 million appropriated to the Department of State; $34 million in 
the 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act; and $1 million for foreign military financing allotted 
from the supplementary appropriation for financ ial year 2003.
c These figures are for appropriations.
d These figures include $88 million in funding transferred by the Department of State to the Department of Justice for 
its rule-of-law programmes.
e In financial years 2000–2003 the Department of State transferred $375 million to USAID for alternative development, 
democracy and rule of law, and internally displaced persons programmes. In financial year 2004 the US Congress directly 
appropriated money for these programmes to USAID.
f The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs did not provide complete 
funding data. As a result, the table may not reflect what was actually promised (obligated) and spent (expended).
Source: US Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘Drug control: U.S. non-military assistance to Colombia is 
beginning to show intended results, but programs are not readily sustainable’, GAO Report-04-726, Washington, DC, 
July 2004, table 1, p. 8, and table 2, p. 9.
51 ‘Pentagon contract announcement’, Defense-Aerospace.com, 15 Dec. 2000, URL <http://www.defense-
aerospace.com/produit/3907_us.htm>.
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initiative from the Colombian state, this 
tendency has been reinforced by the pat-
terns of the US assistance.
The second sphere of the possible 
diversion of resources is the transfer of 
funds from the social-related assistance 
budget to security-related issues. The US 
assistance to Colombia has been accused 
of suffering myopia52. Its strong focus on 
the ‘hard’ security aspects of the conflict 
in Colombia has led to an unbalanced 
support which concentrates mainly on 
the military and police, while leaving aside 
key social aspects of the conflict. Between 
2000 and 2004 approximately 82 per cent 
of the US assistance to Colombia was 
for the provision of training and equip-
ment for the military and the police53.
Of the US$3.3 billion aid from the USA 
to Colombia in the period 2000–2004, 
only $575 000 was for non-military as-
sistance (see table 4). The US assistance 
given to Colombia is quite large but it has 
been constrained by the strong focus on 
military aspects, such as controlling the 
illicit traffic of drugs and, subsequently, 
the global war on terrorism (which relates 
to another negative argument from the 
donor countries of the strategic use of aid 
discussed in section III).
The non-military package of the US 
assistance to Colombia is the one that 
supports some of the governance aspects 
of SSR. The package includes, for example, 
programmes to enhance the criminal 
justice system, promote human rights, 
support local government, and promote 
transparency54. Some improvements are 
noticeable in this dimension, but the 
projects often face obstacles such as lack 
of funding and insecurity, which affect 
the overall attainment of the programme’s 
aims55. These budget cuts have led to, for 
example, the lowering of the initial targets, 
obstacles to the hand-over of responsibility 
for these programmes to the Colombian 
Government or even the endangering of 
the sustainability of the projects. Various 
governance areas need further support. For 
instance, the justice sector, even though it 
is independent, is still overloaded, corrupt 
and intimidated by the rebel groups and 
criminal gangs, and hence ineffective56. At 
the same line, establishment of democratic 
control of the military is in progress, but 
there are still gross violations of human 
rights by the armed forces. The US State 
Department has acknowledged that even 
52 Christman, D. W. et al., Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region, 
Report of an Independent Commission Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive 
Action (Council on Foreign Relations: New York, 2004), p. 15.
53 Sköns et al. (note xxxix), p. 334. 
54 Veillette (note xlix), p. 10. 
55 GAO (note xl), p. 3.
56 GAO (note xl), p. 11. 
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though the military is under civilian con-
trol, there are still cases of military consent 
for paramilitary activities and violation of 
human rights remains a problem57. As is 
shown below, these cuts in the non-mili-
tary support to Colombia are a result of 
the limited coherence and coordination of 
the US assistance to Colombia.
The problems of coordination 
and coherence 
Assessing the problem of coordina-
tion and coherence involves looking at 
how the internal agencies in the donor 
country work with those of the recipient 
country and with the rest of the interna-
tional donor community. Particularly in 
the case of SSR the USA has not taken a 
coordinated approach to its policies, and 
this is evidenced in Colombia. 
 The main US offices working to 
support Plan Colombia are the Interna-
tional Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
(INL) office of the State Department, 
the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR), the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), 
the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) and the Department of Defense 
through the Southern Command. Two 
main reports on Plan Colombia have 
underlined the deficiency in coordina-
tion between these agencies. According 
to the Council on Foreign Relations each 
of these offices pursues its programmes 
in a policy vacuum58. A report from the 
US Government Accountability Office in 
2004 further described the problems with 
internal coordination faced in many of the 
non-military programmes in Colombia. 
Among many examples, the report stated 
that some grantees of non-military assis-
tance programmes have never met in order 
to coordinate their work due to barriers 
and disincentives. For example, some proj-
ects are executed by two different grantees, 
and if the beneficiary targets are achieved 
by only one of the grantees the project can 
be claimed to be accomplished. This has 
created disincentives to cooperate among 
grantees, while also creating individual 
competition59. One example is that half 
of the grantees working with USAID did 
not know that the US State Department 
was also involved with their programmes, 
in this case assistance to displaced people; 
they therefore had no knowledge of 
whether the beneficiaries had already re-
ceived humanitarian assistance from the 
State Department60.
The coordination between the USA 
and the international community has 
been neglected since the beginning of 
57 Veillette (note xlix), p. 11. 
58 Christman et al. (note lii), p. 18.
59 GAO (note xl), p. 23.
60 GAO (note xl), p. 24.
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Plan Colombia. The European Union 
(EU), Japan and the United Nations 
(UN) disagreed with the USA’s focus on 
assistance for counter-narcotic activity 
and have instead engaged in separate small 
projects in Colombia, without coordina-
tion. In addition, while the EU and UN 
keep condemning the Colombian state 
for gross violation of human rights (while 
recognizing that it is not a state policy), 
the USA continues to certify Colombia as 
meeting human rights standards. In fact, 
several non-governmental organizations 
that monitor human rights have criticized 
the US State Department for continuously 
certifying Colombian progress on human 
rights issues61. The international com-
munity has no coordinated voice on this 
matter, hence it has been sending mixed 
messages to Colombia while the USA has 
portrayed the EU and UN as making unfair 
judgments on the situation in the country. 
For example, in the beginning of 2006 
Colombian Vice–President Francisco 
Santos Calderón publicly questioned the 
data published in a UN report and regret-
ted that the document was not objective 
while pretending to be neutral62. Relations 
between the Colombian Government and 
the UN have been unstable, particularly 
during the Uribe administration, deterring 
further engagement by the UN63.
Regarding the coherence of the pro-
gramme, attaining peace in Colombia 
requires a move beyond the strong sup-
port for counter-narcotic activity. It will 
require a holistic approach that entails 
assistance to the peace negotiations and 
the subsequent DDR process; strong sup-
port for addressing Colombia’s rural and 
infrastructure problems; cooperation to 
create a regional trade regime; and more 
general development initiatives for the 
neglected areas of the country64. As a report 
from the Council on Foreign Relations 
has established, there has been an exces-
sive focus on the supply side of the drugs 
problem, plus the sustainability of the 
anti-drug initiatives is in question. As long 
as social inequalities and injustices remain 
in the country, the incentives for engaging 
in illicit drugs cultivation and trafficking 
will remain. The Council on Foreign Rela-
tions thus suggests that the USA strongly 
supports land reform and rural develop-
ment in Colombia. Another area of focus 
61 Veillette (note xlix), p. 11. 
62 ‘Representante de Derechos Humanos de la ONU, Michael Frühling, se despide de Colombia’ [UN 
Human Rights Representative, Michel Frühling, says goodbye to Colombia], El Tiempo, 21 Feb. 2006, 
URL <http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/DER_HUMANOS/derechoshumanos/ARTICULO-WEB-_NOTA_
INTERIOR-2755285.html>. 
63 ‘The UN’s Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for $62 million in humanitarian assistance to Colombia 
is underfunded. Donations as for November 2003 amounted to approximately $14 million, of which the 
US contributed about 42 percent.’ GAO (note xl), p. 24. 
64 Christman et al. (note lii), p. 30. 
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should be the Alternative Development 
Program (ADP), which should comple-
ment the Aerial Eradication Program 
(AEP) in order to provide new opportuni-
ties for peasants to withdraw from illicit 
markets. Currently, these programmes 
are not fully complementary due to lack 
of efficient and sufficient support to the 
ADP–for the ADP to be comprehensive 
would need approximately US$4 billion 
over 3 years, while USAID plans to give 
only US$234 million65.
The mainly military and counter-
narcotics emphasis of the USA is not 
having the intended results. The US State 
Department admitted the shortcoming 
in the US approach to Colombia, while 
quoting a 2006 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR). The 
latter pointed out that, while 170 000 
hectares of illegal coca plantations have 
been destroyed, in 2005 the drug pro-
ducers replanted nearly the same area66. 
Drugs-trafficking alongside other criminal 
acts such as kidnapping fuels the conflict 
in Colombia. However, these are not the 
essence of the Colombian conflict. As 
stated above, the country has weak rule 
of law, widespread corruption, oligarchic 
economic and political systems, and tre-
mendous social injustices.
In conclusion, the USA’s focus on the 
military approach in Colombia has led to a 
diversion of resources from the social sector 
to the military, both in the US assistance 
package to Colombia and in the recipient’s 
national public spending priorities. The 
US support is not achieving its objectives, 
due in part to the lack of coherence and 
coordination of the assistance. Hence, 
these specific arguments against engage-
ment in SSR are illustrated by the case of 
US assistance to Colombia. However, a 
combination of even more factors prob-
ably contributes to this outcome, such as 
the limited knowledge of the Colombian 
conflict in the USA, the use of assistance 
as a strategic tool or the short-term inter-
est in attaining quick results. It would be 
misleading to conclude that all donors that 
have been involved in SSR have faced as 
many limitations as in this case. Indeed, 
there are some successful cases that prove 
the opposite, such as the case of the UK’s 
assistance to Sierra Leone. 
sierra Leone: a background
West African countries are quite un-
stable given their experiences with civil 
wars and their widespread poverty. Sierra 
Leone’s experience is therefore not unique, 
but in the 2005 HDR its HDI was second 
lowest (176th of 177 countries) and its 
civil war was one of the most violent, 
known for its cruel mutilation practices 
65 GAO (note xl), p. 11.  
66 ‘US policy at a critical crossroads’, Latin America Security & Strategic Review, Mar. 2006, URL <http://
www.latinnews.com/lss/LSS9492.asp?instance=2>. 
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and the large number of child soldiers. 
Around 500 000 people were displaced 
and nearly 60 000 died as a consequence 
of the conflict67. While the complexities 
of every violent conflict are numerous, 
this section gives a brief description of 
the history of the conflict in Sierra Leone 
in order to frame the country’s security 
sector challenges.
The conflict started in 1991 when 
rebel groups, with support from Liberian 
groups, rose against the Sierra Leonean 
Government which, as well as being 
corrupt, was highly centralized in the 
capital, Freetown, thus neglecting far away 
provinces and the large youth population. 
The conflict was fuelled by the propaga-
tion of small arms and illegal financing 
through the mining of diamonds. Dur-
ing the conflict three coups d’état took 
place; in one case (1997) the coup leader 
invited the leader of a rebel group to share 
government. The Economic Community 
of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Moni-
toring Group (ECOMOG), which was 
mainly Nigerian, restored the democrati-
cally elected government in 1998, but the 
rebel groups continued fighting, taking 
over large parts of the country. In 1999 
the Sierra Leonean Government and the 
rebel groups signed a peace agreement in 
Lomé and UN peacekeeping interven-
tions were arranged—first the unarmed 
UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNOMSIL) and then the UN Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In spite of the 
peace agreement, the conflict continued; 
the turning point came when UNAMSIL 
peacekeepers were taken as hostages and 
the UK intervened militarily in support 
of the UN mission in restoring order in 
Freetown. By 2000 the rebel resistance 
was over and a ceasefire agreement was 
signed in Abuja. Thereafter, consolida-
tion of the peace process has been taking 
place, accompanied by the retaking of the 
rebel-held areas and the demobilization of 
combatants. The security sector in Sierra 
Leone has to be understood in the subse-
quent post-conflict situation. 
Sierra Leone’s young security sector, 
established after independence in 1961, 
had nearly vanished after the civil war. 
Hence, the SSR support to Sierra Leone 
must be considered as a reconstruction 
of the security institutions almost from 
scratch. The political system had become 
highly militarized, with civil–military rela-
tions basically represented by the military’s 
interaction with the executive. The MOD 
had only a limited number of civil ser-
vants, who were usually by-passed by the 
military, which preferred to have direct 
contact with the president instead of dis-
67 Seybolt, T. B., ‘Major armed conflicts’, SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), pp. 30–31.
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cussing military matters with the civilians 
in the ministry68. This politicization of the 
security sector was also seen in recruitment 
and promotion processes: the hierarchy 
of the armed forces was overlooked and 
merit was not taken into consideration. As 
a result of corruption and this politiciza-
tion, the armed forces were undisciplined 
and inefficient. At the same time, morale 
and incentives for efficient work lowered 
because of the lack of equipment, training 
and welfare support69. Furthermore, the 
monopoly of the military over security 
affairs did not permit the creation of a 
civilian interest in making the security sec-
tor accountable. Hence, the security forces 
were above the democratic and governance 
processes, and were subject to almost no 
control or auditing.
There were also security sector chal-
lenges in 2002 for Sierra Leone beyond 
civil–military relations. The demobili-
zation process was one of the greatest 
problems of the country’s security sector. 
In 2002 nearly 24 000 ex-combatants 
were awaiting reintegration in legal secu-
rity forces and more demobilized soldiers 
were to come in subsequent years. Some 
ex-combatants were reintegrated in the 
army or police forces, but the security 
forces were not capable of assimilating all 
the demobilized soldiers. Instead, in 2002 
both the Armed Forces of Liberia and the 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) rebel group recruited 
some Sierra Leonean ex-combatants to 
fight in the neighbouring country70. The 
rule of law was also extremely weak in Si-
erra Leone, particularly in remote areas. In 
the diamond-mining areas, for example, 
there was constant competition for access 
to resources, with residents being expelled 
and advantage being taking of the absence 
of state control71. A 2002 UN report stated 
that law and order in many districts of the 
country faced logistical problems, such as 
an unprepared police force and judicial 
and penal systems with partial coverage. 
The report also pointed out the need to 
support the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and to assist the construction 
of local capacity for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. There was a 
need to build judicial capabilities in order 
to consolidate peace and the rule of law 
in the country72. 
68 Gbla, O., ‘Sierra Leone’, Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of 
Control, eds W. Omitoogun and E. Hutchful (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006), p. 192.
69 Bryden, A. et al., ‘Security sector governance in West Africa: turning principles to practice’, Policy Paper 
no. 8, Geneva Centre fort the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Nov. 2005, p. 8. 
70 UN Security Council, Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, UN document S/2002/987, 5 Sep. 2002, p.1. 
71 This was the case in districts like Kono and Tongo Fields, where ‘Thuggish youth groups [attempted] to 
fill the vacuum by the absence of firm Government control’. UN Security Council (note lxx), p. 2. 
72 UN Security Council (note lxx), pp. 8–9.
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In addition to the strong support 
received from the UN in Sierra Leone, 
the UK has played a key role in stabiliz-
ing the country. The UK’s objective in 
assisting Sierra Leone is to create a con-
flict-prevention strategy for this country. 
The UK’s first engagement in Sierra Leone 
was in 1998 as a result of Sierra Leonean 
President Tejan Kabbah’s desire to have 
professional armed forces and to enhance 
the police’s role. The British Government 
was invited to contribute to this initiative 
and responded with a contribution from 
the FCO of £10 million to draft a SSR 
initiative for Sierra Leone. Subsequently, 
the British DFID donated £20 million in 
order to execute the SSR over a three-year 
period73. Thus, in June 1999 the first stage 
of the British-supported SSR was launched. 
With the end of the three-year strategy and 
with the declaration of the end of the civil 
war, the Sierra Leonean and British govern-
ments signed a 10-year collaboration plan 
in 2002 for reconstruction and poverty 
alleviation. For the period 2002–2004 
the UK allocated £120 million to support 
Sierra Leone, four times more than the 
initial £30 million in aid given in the first 
stage of the assistance in 1999.  
The UK objectives for its assistance 
strategy in Sierra Leone can be summa-
rized in three main points: (a) the creation 
of effective, affordable and democratically 
accountable security agencies with the na-
tional capacity to protect the country from 
internal and external threats; (b) effective 
reconciliation, justice and the reintegra-
tion of ex-combatants; and (c) reduction 
of regional threats to Sierra Leone74. Of 
the outcomes achieved, the most notice-
able are the more professional and trained 
armed forces; the creation of an MOD 
under civilian control and managed by 
both military and civilian personnel; the 
publication of a Defence White Paper; and 
the establishment of two important agen-
cies: the Office of National Security and 
the Central Intelligence and Security Unit. 
There has been also a successful develop-
ment of legal and institutional frameworks 
for national security and defence, with the 
aim of controlling corruption and pro-
moting transparency. An additional par-
ticular accomplishment was the reform in 
the Sierra Leonean Police (SLP). Not only 
is the SLP more visible in Freetown, but 
both the capacity and moral of the force 
has been enhanced. Local ownership was 
also advanced in 2003 with the departure 
of the British Inspector-General of Police 
and his replacement by a local75. 
As described above, the UK’s support 
73 Sköns et al. (note xxxix), p. 338, 
74 Ginifer, J., ‘Evaluation of the conflict prevention pools: Sierra Leone’, Evaluation Report EV 647, DFID, 
London, Mar. 2004, URL <http//:www2.dfif.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf>, p. 1
75 Stone, C. et al., Supporting Security, Justice and Development: Lessons for a New Era (Vera Institute of 
Justice: New York, 2005), p.18. 
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to Sierra Leone is a SSR strategy since it 
involves holistic approach to activities in 
the security institutions of the recipient 
country. There are programmes for the 
professionalization and modernization of 
the armed forces; the provision of support 
to the police; and assistance for the gov-
ernment in retaking control of previously 
dangerous areas. The UK also provides aid 
for enhancing the rule of law, civil–mili-
tary relations and governance aspects like 
control of corruption and transparency. 
The British role has also been key to re-
establishing the effectiveness of the justice 
sector and in DDR programmes.
The arguments against engaging 
in ssr assistance: the case of 
sierra Leone 
This section examines whether the 
arguments from the donor community 
against engaging in SSR support are il-
lustrated in the case of the UK’s assistance 
to Sierra Leone, particularly the fears 
regarding: (a) the diversion of resources 
to the military; and (b) the problems of 
coordination and coherence. The same 
benchmarks from the Colombian case 
are assessed, in order to facilitate the 
comparison. 
The diversion of resources 
to the military
The fear that resources will be trans-
ferred from social expenditure to the 
security sector has been present in Africa, 
particularly on the donors’ side. African 
countries are among the most resource 
constrained, while suffering acute human 
security challenges that need to be tack-
led. As stated above, the transfer is feared 
in both the national and international 
spheres. The international assistance can 
influence national public policies since 
programmes must be followed and sus-
tained. In the case of Sierra Leone, the 
holistic and long-term engagement of the 
UK has prevented (or delayed) this con-
cern; this is shown below, first through the 
analysis of national military expenditure, 
then by describing the public expenditure 
priorities and finally with the examination 
of the focus of British assistance.
As stated above, there are many 
limitations when measuring the security 
spending of a country. One of the most 
relevant limitations is that data usually 
only covers the military sector, which is 
the case for Sierra Leone. Beyond this 
limitation, Sierra Leonean military spend-
ing is rather complicated to examine. 
To begin with, for the chosen period 
1995–2004, military regimes and very 
weak democratic institutions mean that 
an accurate picture of the trends in the 
military expenditure in this country is 
hard to come by. For instance, during the 
1997–98 dictatorship of Major Johnny 
Paul Koroma, the Central Bank Governor 
was instructed directly to release money 
from the Consolidated Fund to finance 
the military without any formal budget-
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ary practice76. Indeed, as shown in table 5, 
there are no data available for 1998–99, 
coinciding with the period in which the 
military government made budget deci-
sions. Off-budget revenues were also a 
practice in the military budgetary process, 
but these were often not reflected in the 
expenditure provision figures. However, 
military expenditure in Sierra Leone has 
steadily decreased, particularly in the pe-
riod 2000–2004, dropping by 71 per cent 
as a share of GDP. This coincides with the 
period of the UK’s strong support.
It should be noted that the fall in 
military expenditure since 2000 does not 
mean that there has not been heavy invest-
ment in the recovery of the military sec-
tor after the end of the civil war. Indeed, 
the reason for the relatively low share of 
GDP invested in the military is that the 
international community, particularly the 
UK, has financed most of the moderniza-
tion, training and professionalization 
programmes. The long-term engagement 
from the UK has meant that Sierra Leone 
has not needed to spend large amounts 
on the military in recent years, and thus 
social investment has not been displaced 
by increases in defence-related allocations. 
After British assistance ends, an effect 
Table 5. 
MiLiTary EXPEndiTurE in siErra LEonE as a sharE of Gross doMEsTic ProducT, 1995–2004
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Military expenditure  2.9 2.0 1.1 . . . . 4.1 2.4 1.7 1.8 1.2
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, SIPRI, Stockholm, 
2006, URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html>.
Table 6. 
EducaTion, hEaLTh and MiLiTary EXPEndiTurE in siErra LEonE as a PErcEnTaGE of Gross doMEsTic 
ProducT, 1998–2001
 Education Health Military
1998 1.0 1.3 . .
1999 . . 2.0 . .
2000 3.8 2.6 4.1
2001 . . 2.6 2.4
Source: Perdomo, C., ‘Tables of military and social expenditure’, Background Paper, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2004, URL 
<http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/bgpapers/frontpage.html>. 
76 Gbla (note 67), p. 193.
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on social spending could be seen in the 
future. For example, the 2004 military 
expenditure budget for Sierra Leone was 
$34 million, half of which was provided 
by the UK (see tables 5 and 7).
Unfortunately, for the years that 
comparable data on education, health 
and military are available, Sierra Leone 
was at war and the data have low reli-
ability. Furthermore, data, particularly 
on education and military expenditure, 
are not available for certain years, making 
the comparison inconsistent (see table 6). 
The reason for this lack of information is 
the poor state of government institutions 
during the conflict. As a consequence, it is 
difficult to establish a trend in the national 
budget priorities. Osman Gbla, a Senior 
Researcher from the Center for Develop-
ment and Security Analysis in Freetown, 
has established that the military is not 
treated with preferential treatment and 
indeed has to compete with other public 
priorities, particularly since 2001. In 2002 
the parliament only allocated 30 per cent 
of the sum requested by the military, al-
though it still obtained the third largest 
portion of the budget after education and 
health77. The military budgeting process 
changed significantly after a number of 
reforms in the democratization of the 
security sector. The adoption of the Me-
dium-Term Expenditure Framework in 
2001, for example, provided for sectoral 
planning, a more participatory process and 
outcome, and thus a more efficient system 
for military expenditure. So, even though 
it is difficult to assess the government’s 
expenditure priorities in Sierra Leone, the 
improvements in budgetary processes have 
reduced the opportunities for abuse of na-
tional resources with unbalanced or unrea-
sonable military budgets. An accountable 
and transparent process for determining 
the national budget contributes to an 
effective prioritization of the national re-
Table 7. 
BriTish assisTancE To siErra LEonE, financiaL yEars 2002/2003–2005/2006
Figures are in thousands of pounds sterling, at current prices. Years are financial years.
Source: Sköns, E. et al., ‘Military expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), p. 338.
Type of assistance  2002/2003  2003/2004  2004/2005  2005/2006   2005/2006 
Military assistance 14 165  14 801  17 245  17 139  63 350 
Other assistance 33 044 33 000 40 000 40 000 146 044
Total  47 209  47 801  57 245  57 139  209 394 
Total, 
2002/2003–
77 Gbla (note lxviii), p. 187.
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sources. The question addressed below is 
whether the UK’s assistance has influenced 
this change to a more democratic budget-
ing process in Sierra Leone.
The British Government’s holistic 
approach has indeed supported an im-
provement of the control of Sierra Leone’s 
national budget. The aim of the British 
partnership with Sierra Leone is to form 
effective, affordable and democratically 
accountable security agencies. Hence, the 
bulk of the military assistance is framed 
within governance principles, preventing 
any extreme focus on the military. Much 
of the spending on the security sector for 
its improvement and effectiveness is highly 
dependant on the British support. This 
has probably prevented a high investment 
by the Sierra Leonean Government in the 
military sector.
Another possible explanation for the 
rather balanced public expenditure priori-
ties in Sierra Leone is that the British Gov-
ernment support pays heavily attention to 
the non-military aspects of peace-building 
and development in Sierra Leone. Indeed, 
the non-military-related assistance to Si-
erra Leone is more than twice the military 
support (see table 7). As noted above, the 
donors’ strategies influence the recipients’ 
policies since the recipient has to follow 
programmes. The UK’s holistic approach 
involves coordination and coherence from 
its state agencies working with Sierra Le-
one, as is described below.
The problems of coordination 
and coherence
The second benchmark to assess is the 
coordination and coherence of internal 
agencies within the donor country and 
of the donor country with the rest of the 
donor international community. In the 
case of the UK’s assistance to Sierra Leone, 
there has been coordination and coher-
ence, particularly thanks to the African 
Conflict-Prevention Pool (ACPP), which 
provides a formal space for inter-depart-
mental cooperation and that permits a 
more coordinated strategy with the other 
donor partners.
A specific policy for internal agency 
cooperation did not exist in the UK prior 
to mid- 2002. It was only after DFID 
introduced the concept of SSR that is-
sues cutting across different state agencies 
created a stronger argument for coordi-
nation. The main agencies involved in a 
coordinated strategy for SSR in the UK are 
the MOD, the FCO and DFID. The case 
of Sierra Leone was one of the first—to-
gether with Indonesia—to have a formal 
mechanism promoting coordination. An 
evaluation of the ACPP, specifically for 
the case of Sierra Leone, has stated that 
before the appearance of the pools there 
was not a sense of coordination between 
the objectives and duties of the different 
British departments in the recipient coun-
try78. The creation of the ACPP facilitated 
78 Ginifer (note lxxiv) p. 24. 
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a coordinated justification of programmes 
and budgeting, while it also expanded 
the recognition that there is a relation-
ship between democratic civil–military 
relations (pursuit by the MOD’s Defence 
Diplomacy programme), SSR support 
(promoted by DFID) and the programmes 
relating justice sector reform, safety and 
security (also done by DFID). 
Of course inter-departmental coordi-
nation is not perfect, but at least there is 
a formal procedure to promote dialogue 
and cooperation between state agencies. 
Among the problems of coordination in 
Sierra Leone is that meetings to discuss 
the ACPP are part of other discussions, 
hence there are no formal and regular 
meetings on the specific subject of the 
ACPP. In the same way, the meetings with 
the Sierra Leonean Government seem to 
be quite informal and do not take place 
regularly. This has posed questions about 
the UK’s ability to pass on the holistic 
SSR approach to the Sierra Leonean 
Government. National and international 
NGOs have also expressed their discontent 
regarding the lack of coordination and 
consultation from the UK (particularly 
DFID). Apparently, DFID has been absent 
from several meetings organized by NGOs, 
although it has always been invited. These 
coordination complications with the Si-
erra Leonean Government and the NGOs 
can ultimately complicate the degree of 
local ownership of the British support 
programmes.
Despite this, it is worth saying that 
the British assistance has most of the time 
considered coordination with the UN as 
being crucial, and this pre-dates the cre-
ation of the ACPP. Formal meetings with 
UNAMSIL have been a key part of the 
assistance strategy, and furthermore the 
British support to the UNASMIL troops 
was central to restoring peace and security 
in the country. While critical for prepar-
ing the Sierra Leonean security forces to 
prepare for the withdrawal of UNAMSIL, 
there have been some differences, particu-
larly with the UN civilian police, since the 
UK and the UN have different policing 
models. However, in general, the UK’s 
coordination with external actors has been 
part of the assistance approach within the 
ACPP. On other fronts, the British offices 
have supported the UNDP and USAID in 
the DDR programmes, and hence, have 
been actively engaged in the Multi-donor 
Trust Fund, for example79.
Regarding coherence, the UK ac-
knowledges the importance to tackling the 
social areas of the security problems and of 
not neglecting the regional component of 
the conflict in Sierra Leone. Concerning 
the first issue, the social component of 
the conflict, the UK supports programmes 
such as an Anti-Corruption Commission, 
the rehabilitation of the legal system, aid 
79 See Ginifer (note lxxiv), pp. 20–25.
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to the National Electoral Commission 
and Sierra Leone’s Special Court, the 
strengthening of financial management 
systems, civil service reform, support to 
the diamond industry and assistance for 
the elaboration of the poverty-reduction 
strategy80. Indeed, of the overall support 
(provided and planned) of the British to 
Sierra Leone, 70 per cent is non-military 
assistance (see table 7). Some areas have 
been pointed out as being unattended or 
not given enough attention. Among them 
is the engagement of the young popula-
tion in Sierra Leone, which comprises 50 
per cent of individuals under age 18. As 
noted above, the guerrilla groups sustained 
themselves with the support of child sol-
diers, who committed gross mutilations 
and rapes during the conflict. Hence, fail-
ing to fully integrate the young segments 
of the population could signify a major 
source of unrest in the future81. 
Concerning the second issue—not 
neglecting the regional component of the 
conflict—the UK has, together with the 
USA and through ECOWAS, been sup-
porting a post-Taylor strategy82 in order to 
boost peace-building capacities in the re-
gion. With the same aim, special training 
has been provided to the Sierra Leonean 
armed forces and police to deter possible 
spill-over from the conflicts in Liberia, 
Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire83. 
In conclusion, the case of Sierra Le-
one demonstrates that designing a holistic 
SSR programme should include both the 
hard and soft security problems accord-
ing to the recipient’s needs. This will be 
reflected in the funding assistance package 
to the recipient country, which will be 
at the same time key in influencing the 
recipient’s policies towards development 
and stability. It is central to achieving 
such a holistic approach that the different 
institutions from the donor country are in 
permanent coordination, while permitting 
a coherent approach to the programme 
plans and practices. In the specific case 
of the SSR assistance to Sierra Leone im-
portant problems remain. It is key for the 
UK to establish a clearer policy to enhance 
local ownership in order to facilitate the 
upcoming hand-over of the programmes 
to the recipient country. There is particu-
lar risk of a vacuum in the future financing 
of the security sector, since it has been 
heavily financed by the UK, and the Sierra 
Leone Government might have trouble in 
sustaining these levels of spending. The 
next section illustrates the results of the 
80 Sköns et al. (note xxxix), p. 340.
81 ‘Sustaining peace in Sierra Leone: assessing indigenous capacity to maintain stability and peace in parallel 
with the UNAMSIL drawdown’, Graduate Student Working Group, Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs, Princeton University, Dec. 2002, p. 2.
82 This refers to the former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who was ousted in 2003. 
83 Ginifer (note lxxiv) p. 16. 
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comparison between the cases of US assis-
tance to Colombia and British assistance 
to Sierra Leone.  
 
The comparison 
Both the conflict in Colombia and 
that in Sierra Leone have particularities 
that cannot be identified entirely in this 
paper. Nevertheless, some key differences 
should be mentioned. Colombia has been 
a consolidated democracy since 1958, 
but with limited democratic control of 
the military84. Hence, the challenge for 
Colombia in SSR is to consolidate the ex-
isting democratic institutions that exercise 
security sector governance and to increase 
their efficiency and effectiveness. Whereas 
in the case of Sierra Leone the imperative 
is to build democratic security sector in-
stitutions from scratch, since the civil war 
destroyed the security establishment.
Colombia and Sierra Leone represent 
extreme cases compared to the SSR pro-
cesses in other countries. European donors 
have sponsored most SSR programmes, but 
the international support for Colombian 
SSR has been sponsored mainly by the 
USA. Of the European SSR programmes, 
Sierra Leone is the most successful case, 
with the UK as the leading donor in this 
process. As explained above, the USA and 
the UK have distinct approaches to SSR. 
On the one hand, the USA has not engaged 
explicitly in SSR support but has imple-
mented separate assistance programmes 
within a package—Plan Colombia—that 
can be categorized as SSR with little inter-
nal coordination and coherence of the US 
government departments. On the other 
hand, the UK has been the country most 
engaged in the SSR support, taking a con-
sistent approach within its state agencies. 
Therefore, while Plan Colombia resembles 
an uncoordinated SSR assistance, SSR as-
sistance to Sierra Leone is coordinated85.
This has had an impact on the coherence 
of the assistance strategies, which in both 
cases is reflected in the balance of the aid 
budgets. In the case of the US assistance to 
Colombia there is an unbalanced support, 
which leans towards military assistance, 
whereas the British assistance to Sierra 
Leone has a larger social component that is 
complemented by a military strategy. The 
US support of Plan Colombia is a result of 
its interest in reducing the threat of illegal 
drug-trafficking to the USA, while the ob-
jective of the assistance given by the UK to 
Sierra Leone is to prevent conflict86. 
84 Bruneau (note xxxiv), p. 233.
85 Ball, N., ‘Evaluation of the conflict prevention pools: the security sector reform strategy’, Evaluation 
Report EV 647, DFID, London, Mar. 2004, p. 27, URL <http://www2.dfif.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/
files/ev647ssr.pdf>.
86 Sköns et al. (note xxxix), p. 342
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v. concLusions
Some of the poorest countries in the 
world bear the expensive burden of fight-
ing wars and recovering from them. These 
countries are trapped in this situation 
since the lack of security destabilizes the 
factors necessary for development, while 
poverty, inequality or lack of freedom do 
not provide the context for peace and 
security to flourish. Both the donor and 
recipient communities have acknowledged 
that development and security go hand-to-
hand and that there is a need to support 
both in a holistic manner. Security sector 
reform is a way to support security within 
the broad development agenda. However, 
even though, conceptually, there is way to 
bring SSR into the development discourse, 
there are a number of arguments against 
engaging with SSR assistance, from both 
the donor and recipient countries.
Two arguments against incorporat-
ing SSR in the development agenda are 
examined in this paper: (a) the diversion 
of resources to the military; and (b) the 
problems of lack of coordination and 
coherence. The case studies of the US as-
sistance to Colombia and British assistance 
to Sierra Leone illustrate that some of these 
negative arguments can be relevant. In 
the first case, the US assistance package is 
dominated by military components. This 
has led to insufficient support to non-
military components of the assistance, 
making the overall support inefficient. The 
imbalance in the aid given to Colombia has 
influenced the way the Colombian Gov-
ernment is tackling its problems, partly 
because the US support has to be followed 
up. Hence, the Colombian Government is 
also increasingly investing in military mat-
ters, while decreasing some aspects of social 
expenditure. The unbalanced US assis-
tance reflects the lack of coordination and 
coherence of the US agencies working in 
Colombia. The communication between 
agencies is poor and in some cases nonex-
istent. This reflects the fact that only some 
US agencies understand the importance of 
holistic assistance to Colombia, while the 
others focus mainly on the war on drugs. 
International coordination and coherence, 
particularly with the EU and the UN, has 
been deterred partly due to the USA’s mili-
taristic approach to Colombia.
The British assistance to Sierra Leone 
is much more balanced towards non-
military aid, while complementing it 
with military support. The Sierra Leonean 
Government shares this prioritization of 
social aspects, while still making efforts to 
support the military. However, it remains 
to be seen if the pattern of national spend-
ing will change when the UK’s assistance 
stops—Sierra Leone is dependent on 
foreign support for financing the military. 
The British approach to Sierra Leone is 
coherent, given that different agencies 
understand the importance of a holistic 
approach. This is a product of the ACPP 
which offers a space for coordination and 
discussion with national and international 
donor agencies. It must be said that prob-
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lems remain regarding coordination with 
local actors. This has made difficult the 
transfer of the programmes from the UK 
to Sierra Leoneans.
One possible way to limit the po-
tential negative impacts of supporting 
SSR is to formulate the SSR as genuine 
cooperation with the recipient country. 
This requires a true understanding of the 
needs of the recipient country and that the 
objectives of the support should ultimately 
 Security sector actors are accountable to 
civil society, including the civilian elected 
authorities.
 Security sector actors follow both national 
constitutional law and international law. 
 Government and civil society can access 
the planning and budgeting documents 
of the security sector.
 Security sectors resources are managed 
with discipline and in a comprehensive 
way.
 Civil-military relations are based on three 
key components: a well articulated au-
thority; mutual rights and obligations; 
and the respect of human rights. 
 The operations and budget of the security 
sector are under control of civil authori-
ties.
 Civil society monitors the security sector.
 Po litical debate on security sector is open 
to contributions from civil society. 
 The environment permits that the civil 
society is consulted on issues such as secu-
rity policies, security resource allocations, 
and other relevant aspects. 
 Security sector personnel are professional 
and exercise their duties democratically.
 Policy-makers prioritize peace and secure 
environments in the region and sub-re-
gion. 
be for the benefit of the country receiving 
the aid. A second way is to emphasize the 
importance of the agencies having space 
for communicating with each other, since 
this improves cooperation and spreads 
knowledge of all the recipient’s problems 
and will facilitate a coherent assistance. Fi-
nally, it is key to promote local ownership 
of the assistance so that the programmes 
can be sustained and accommodated to 
the local realities.
aPPEndiX 1. 
PrinciPLEs of sEcuriTy sEcTor GovErnancE
security sector reform should aim at achieving these key principles 
of security sector governance:  
Source: UK Department for International Development (DFID), Security Sector Reform and the Management of 
Military Expenditure: High Risks for Donors, High Returns for Development, Report on an International Symposium 
sponsored by the UK Department for International Development, (DFID: London, 15– 27 February 2000), p. 46.
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